April 2017

POST-HELLER
LITIGATION SUMMARY

Introduction and Overview

Since the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence has tracked all Second Amendment challenges to federal, state, and local gun laws. This document analyzes the state of Second Amendment jurisprudence after Heller and examines its implications for many different laws designed to reduce gun violence. In preparing this analysis, we have examined over 1,150 federal and state post-Heller Second Amendment decisions.

We summarize here the most important Second Amendment lawsuits and decisions since Heller. We also provide a wide variety of Second Amendment resources on our website: http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/the-second-amendment/.

A. Heller and McDonald

In a 5-4 ruling in Heller, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the Second Amendment protects an individual right of law-abiding citizens to possess an operable handgun in the home for self-defense. Accordingly, the Court struck down Washington D.C. laws prohibiting handgun possession and requiring that firearms in the home be stored unloaded and disassembled or locked at all times.

The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the Second Amendment right is “not unlimited,” and does not confer a “right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” The Court noted, for example, that courts historically have concluded that “prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment,” and it identified a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” including “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” laws forbidding guns in “sensitive places” like schools and government buildings, and “conditions and qualifications” on the commercial sale of firearms. The Court also noted that laws banning “dangerous and unusual weapons,” such as M-16 rifles

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1 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
2 Id. at 626-27, 627 n.26.
and other firearms that are most useful in military service, are consistent with the Second Amendment.\(^3\) Finally, the Court declared that its analysis should not be read to suggest “the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”\(^4\)

In 2010, in *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the Supreme Court held in another 5–4 ruling that the Second Amendment is among the “fundamental rights”\(^5\) that limit state and local governments as well as the federal government. The Court invalidated a Chicago law entirely prohibiting the possession of handguns, but reiterated that a broad spectrum of gun laws remain constitutionally permissible.\(^6\)

B. The Post-*Heller* Landscape: Courts Overwhelmingly Reject Challenges to Federal, State, and Local Gun Laws

Since *Heller* and *McDonald*, courts have been inundated with claims that various federal, state, and local laws regulating firearms violate the Second Amendment. These claims have been asserted in both civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions—and the vast majority of them have failed. *Altogether, in the more than 1,150 state and federal court decisions tracked by the Law Center since *Heller*, courts have rejected the Second Amendment challenges 94% of the time.*

As discussed below, courts have upheld numerous commonsense gun laws against Second Amendment challenges, including laws:

- Requiring “good cause” for the issuance of a permit to carry a concealed firearm;
- Prohibiting the possession of machine guns, assault weapons, and large capacity ammunition magazines;
- Requiring that firearms be stored in a locked container or other secure manner when not in the possession of the owner;
- Forbidding gun possession by dangerous persons including those convicted of felonies and domestic violence crimes, and those who have been involuntarily committed to mental institutions;
- Requiring the registration of all firearms;
- Forbidding persons under 21 years old from possessing firearms or carrying

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\(^3\) *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627 (citations omitted).

\(^4\) *Id.* at 632.

\(^5\) *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 778.

\(^6\) *Id.* at 785-86 (restating “presumptively valid” categories identified in *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, and noting that “[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second Amendment”) (quoting the brief of *amici* supporting petitioners).
• Regulating firing ranges, including zoning, construction, and operation requirements;

• Requiring that handguns sold within a state meet certain safety requirements;

• Imposing fees on the commercial sale of handguns to fund firearm safety regulations; and

• Requiring a waiting period before completing a firearm sale.

By contrast, courts have struck down gun laws in only a handful of cases, and even in those cases, they have been careful to note that most laws designed to reduce gun violence are not prohibited by the Second Amendment.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has declined to review more than 70 Second Amendment cases since *Heller*, leaving lower court decisions upholding many reasonable gun laws undisturbed.

**Post-*Heller* Second Amendment Doctrine**

The *Heller* and *McDonald* decisions left many questions unanswered about how courts should interpret and apply the individual right recognized in those cases. Among the significant issues left open were major methodological questions regarding how courts should evaluate Second Amendment claims, as well as important substantive questions, such as the extent of the Second Amendment’s application outside the home.

A. Lower Courts Have Come to a Near Consensus Regarding How to Analyze Second Amendment Claims

Although different lower courts have suggested a variety of different ways to handle Second Amendment claims, a near-consensus has emerged around a basic two-step inquiry. That methodology asks, first, whether a challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment. If the court finds that it does not, the Second Amendment challenge fails at the threshold, without requiring any further analysis. If a court finds, by contrast, that a regulation indeed implicates conduct protected by the Second Amendment, it then turns to the second step of the analysis, determining the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny and asking whether the law satisfies that scrutiny. As discussed in detail below, the proper level of scrutiny is generally determined by looking at how severely the law in question burdens the “core” Second Amendment right of self-defense.

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in the home.\footnote{See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he level of scrutiny should depend on (1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on the right."); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("A regulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment must have a strong justification, whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be proportionately easier to justify.").}

1. **Step One: The Scope of the Second Amendment**

The first step of the two-pronged inquiry asks whether a challenged law “imposes a burden on conduct falling within the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”\footnote{As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, this question generally turns on “whether the regulation is one of the ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ identified in Heller, or whether the record includes persuasive historical evidence establishing that the regulation at issue is the type of longstanding law historically understood as consistent with the Second Amendment.” In describing the proper scope of the Second Amendment, the Heller Court identified a number of categorical limitations, described below.} As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, this question generally turns on “whether the regulation is one of the ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ identified in Heller, or whether the record includes persuasive historical evidence establishing that the regulation at issue is the type of longstanding law historically understood as consistent with the Second Amendment.”\footnote{In describing the proper scope of the Second Amendment, the Heller Court identified a number of categorical limitations, described below.} In describing the proper scope of the Second Amendment, the Heller Court identified a number of categorical limitations, described below.

a. **“Presumptively Lawful” Regulations**

Heller identified a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful” regulatory measures that courts have generally agreed do not offend the Second Amendment. As noted above, they include “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, [and] laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”\footnote{Because Heller suggested that these “presumptively lawful” regulations fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment, most courts have had little trouble upholding them. At the least, courts have pointed to laws’ “presumptively lawful” status in rejecting the...} Because Heller suggested that these “presumptively lawful” regulations fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment, most courts have had little trouble upholding them.\footnote{At the least, courts have pointed to laws’ “presumptively lawful” status in rejecting the...} At the least, courts have pointed to laws’ “presumptively lawful” status in rejecting the...
application of the most rigorous form of judicial scrutiny, so-called strict scrutiny, to them.14

b. “Dangerous and Unusual” Weapons

The Heller Court also noted that civilian ownership of powerful, military-style weapons such as M-16s, and similarly dangerous weapons, falls outside the protection of the Second Amendment. Lower courts have used this rationale to uphold laws prohibiting or regulating particularly “dangerous and unusual” weapons.15 Courts have uniformly held, for example, that machine guns are “dangerous and unusual” and that barring civilian possession of them does not offend the Second Amendment.16 Courts have also deemed silencers, grenades, bombs, mines, and short-barreled shotguns unprotected “dangerous and unusual” weapons.17 Several courts have also held that military-style assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are unprotected by the Second Amendment, either because they are dangerous and unusual, or because they are comparable to the M-16, a weapon Heller permits prohibiting.18

14 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven if such a measure advanced to step two of our framework, it would trigger our version of ‘intermediate’ scrutiny.”); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (“While the categorical regulation of gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants thus appears consistent with Heller’s reference to certain presumptively lawful regulatory measures, we agree with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion in [United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)] that some sort of showing must be made to support the adoption of a new categorical limit on the Second Amendment right.”).

15 Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (“We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. [United States v. Miller 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)] said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’ We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’.”) (citation omitted); see also Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 451 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Machineguns are dangerous and unusual and therefore not in common use. They do not receive Second Amendment protection, so we uphold Section 922(c) at step one of our framework.”); United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame, 822 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2016) (“In case [United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010)] left any doubt, we repeat today that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns. They are not in common use for lawful purposes.”).

16 E.g., Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 451 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame, 822 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Zaleski, 489 F. App’x 474, 475 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding conviction for possession of a machine gun and noting the Supreme Court’s statement from Heller that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns”).


18 Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“Because the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are ‘like’ M-16 rifles—‘weapons that are most useful in military service’—they are among those arms that the Second Amendment does not shield.”); People v. Zondorak, 220 Cal. App. 4th 829, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); People v. James, 174 Cal. App. 4th 662, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Note that a number of other courts have also
c. “Longstanding” Regulations

_Heller_ recognized that laws sufficiently “longstanding” to be considered consistent with how the right to bear arms has historically been understood also fall outside the Second Amendment. As the D.C. Circuit explained, “_Heller_ tells us ‘longstanding’ regulations are . . . presumed not to burden conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment. This is a reasonable presumption because a regulation that is ‘longstanding,’ which necessarily means it has long been accepted by the public, is not likely to burden a constitutional right; concomitantly the activities covered by a longstanding regulation are presumptively not protected from regulation by the Second Amendment.”

Courts continue to grapple with precisely how long a historical pedigree laws must have to be considered “longstanding” and consistent with the Second Amendment. Several courts have observed that the examples _Heller_ itself identified as “longstanding” and constitutional date not to the Founding Era, but only to the twentieth century. And while a small number of decisions have required proof that a version of a challenged law existed either in 1791, at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, or in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, most courts have recognized that laws of more recent vintage may qualify as sufficiently longstanding to allow resolution of a Second Amendment challenge at step one of the two-step analysis. As the post-_Heller_ jurisprudence continues to develop, the relative

upheld laws prohibiting civilian possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, but used a different rationale—these courts did not determine whether these items are protected by the Second Amendment, but held that even if they do, the prohibitions survived heightened scrutiny at “step two” of the two-step analysis, so were constitutional. See, e.g., _New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo_, 804 F.3d 242, 256-57, 261 (2d Cir. 2015).


_Fyock v. Sunnyvale_, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Although not from the founding era, these early twentieth century regulations might nevertheless demonstrate a history of longstanding regulation if their historical prevalence and significance is properly developed in the record.”);_ Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives_, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) (“_Heller_ considered firearm possession bans on felons and the mentally ill to be longstanding, yet the current versions of these bans are of mid-20th century vintage.”); _United States v. Skoien_, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[L]egal limits on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill also are of 20th Century vintage . . . we do take from _Heller_ the message that exclusions need not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.”); Laurence E. Rosenthal & Adam Winkler, _The Scope of Regulatory Authority under the Second Amendment, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA_ 225, 228 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., The Johns Hopkins University Press 2013) (“[I]n determining the scope of the Second Amendment right,” courts have “conclude[d] that legislatures are not limited to framing-era regulations” because “the laws characterized as presumptively valid in _Heller_ . . . did not exist at the time of ratification.”).

_See Ezell v. City of Chicago_ ( _Ezell I_), 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Second Amendment’s scope as a limitation on the States depends on how the right was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”); _see also Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda_, 822 F.3d 1047, 1058, vacated, _pet. for reh’g en banc granted_, 854 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (vacated panel decision held that challenged ordinance was not “longstanding” where “the County has failed to advance any argument that the zoning ordinance is a type of regulation that Americans at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment (when the right was applied against the States) would have recognized as a permissible infringement of the traditional right.”).

_E.g., Fyock v. Sunnyvale_, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015) (“early twentieth century regulations might . . . demonstrate a history of longstanding regulation if their historical prevalence and significance is properly developed in the record.”); _United States v. Booker_, 644 F.3d 12, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he modern federal felony firearm disqualification law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is firmly rooted in the twentieth century and likely bears little resemblance
age of a law—and the historical pedigree of analogous statutes—will remain a central focus of judicial scrutiny as courts determine whether it is necessary to apply any form of heightened scrutiny in resolving Second Amendment challenges.23

2. Step Two: Applying the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny

If a court finds at the first step of the two-pronged inquiry that a challenged law does, in fact, burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment, it proceeds to step two, and applies “an appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.”24 While what constitutes the “appropriate” level of scrutiny is a subject of continued disagreement among Second Amendment litigants, the majority of courts have embraced so-called intermediate scrutiny.

a. The Rational Basis Test is Not Applicable

The Court in Heller stated that the “rational basis” test—where a law is constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest—is not appropriate in the Second Amendment context. The Court noted that “[if all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”25 Courts have, accordingly, uniformly rejected rational basis scrutiny.

b. The Emerging Consensus in Favor of Intermediate Scrutiny

With rational basis review off the table, courts have chosen between two levels of heightened scrutiny: “intermediate scrutiny,” which examines whether a law is reasonably related to an important or significant governmental interest, and the more rigorous “strict scrutiny,” which asks whether a law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.

to laws in effect at the time the Second Amendment was ratified . . . The recency of enactment and the continuing evolution of this ‘presumptively lawful’ limit on gun ownership support the conclusion that, although the Justices have not established that any particular statute is valid. . . . exclusions need not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.” (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)); see also supra note 20.

24 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that the requirement that applicants demonstrate a ‘justifiable need’ to publicly carry a handgun for self-defense qualifies as a ‘presumptively lawful,’ ‘longstanding’ regulation and therefore does not burden conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. Accordingly, we need not move to the second step [of Second Amendment analysis].”); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1254 (“In sum, the basic requirement to register a handgun is longstanding in American law, accepted for a century in diverse states and cities and now applicable to more than one fourth of the Nation by population. Therefore, we presume the District’s basic registration requirement, including the submission of certain information, does not impinge upon the right protected by the Second Amendment.”) (citations omitted); Silvester v. Harris, 41 F. Supp. 3d 927, 963 (E.D. Cal. 2014), (finding California waiting period law, which traced origin to 1920s, did not qualify as “longstanding”), rev’d on other grounds, 843 F.3d 816, 827-29 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding waiting period law without deciding whether it was “longstanding”).

25 United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (“If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then we move to the second step of applying an appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.”); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We ask first whether a particular provision impinges upon a right protected by the Second Amendment; if it does, then we go on to determine whether the provision passes muster under the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.”).

26 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
Courts have generally agreed that the appropriate level of scrutiny depends on the severity of the challenged law’s burden on Second Amendment rights. The Second Circuit, for example, has stated that heightened scrutiny is only appropriate where the challenged law substantially burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment. The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have said that “the level of scrutiny in the Second Amendment context should depend on ‘the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.”

Using this framework, almost all of the federal courts of appeal, including the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, have applied intermediate scrutiny in resolving Second Amendment challenges. Courts have identified different reasons for applying intermediate scrutiny, but the clear trend suggests that laws which do not prevent law-abiding, responsible individuals from possessing an operable handgun in the home for self-defense should be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.

A few isolated district courts, and some dissenting appellate judges, have called for the application of strict scrutiny in Second Amendment challenges, primarily in cases involving as-applied challenges to federal laws imposing lifetime firearm prohibitions. But, to date, federal circuit courts have rejected the calls for strict scrutiny, even in cases involving as-

26 Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell I), 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the level of applicable scrutiny should be determined by “how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right”); Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1123-24 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (following the Ezell approach); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012).  
27 Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).  
29 United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); Batty v. Albertelli, No. 15-10239-FDS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26124, at *22 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2017) (“Booker’s language has been interpreted as a description of intermediate scrutiny.”); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 348 (5th Cir. 2013); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 692 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to prohibition on assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines); see also Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876-78 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate scrutiny to laws concerning weapons outside of the home, but noting that strict scrutiny may apply to restrictions on the “core right of self-defense in the home”) (quotations and citation omitted).  
31 For example, although a panel of the Fourth Circuit had held that strict scrutiny should be applied in a Second
applied challenges to lifetime firearm prohibitions.\textsuperscript{32} Thus far, no circuit court majority opinion has called for strict scrutiny when reviewing a Second Amendment challenge.

Even the two circuits that have not joined the intermediate scrutiny consensus have not rejected it in favor of traditional strict scrutiny. When the City of Chicago mandated regular training at a shooting range as a condition for gun ownership—but then enacted an absolute ban on shooting ranges in the City of Chicago—a panel of the Seventh Circuit panel struck down the law, applying a standard “more rigorous” than traditional intermediate scrutiny, “if not quite ‘strict scrutiny.’”\textsuperscript{33} The only remaining circuit, the Eleventh, has not squarely decided what level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment challenges.\textsuperscript{34} And while some federal circuit judges have rejected levels of scrutiny altogether in favor of a test based on history and tradition, this view has not been adopted in a majority opinion by any circuit court.\textsuperscript{35}

In rejecting a frequently asserted argument that strict scrutiny should always apply in Second Amendment cases because it is a “fundamental right,” the Tenth Circuit explained that “[t]he risk inherent in firearms and other weapons” distinguishes the Second Amendment “from other fundamental rights that have been held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, such as the right to marry and the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination, which can be exercised without creating a direct risk to others.”\textsuperscript{36} As a result, the court concluded, intermediate scrutiny is generally the proper level of review for Second Amendment

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\textsuperscript{32} See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 692, 699 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (directing that intermediate scrutiny be applied on remand to evaluate as-applied challenge to federal firearm prohibition for persons who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution—a departure from the vacated panel opinion which applied strict scrutiny); Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 398, 351 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate federal firearms prohibition as applied to two plaintiffs with decades-old misdemeanor convictions the court concluded were not “serious”).

\textsuperscript{33} Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell I), 651 F. 3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell II), 846 F.3d 888, 894 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying similar standard when evaluating zoning laws which the court found “severely restrict[ed] the right of Chicagoans to train in firearm use at a range”).

\textsuperscript{34} E.g., Georgia Carry.Org v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1326-29 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction in a Second Amendment challenge, but holding that record was insufficiently developed to perform “full constitutional scrutiny,” and not deciding whether strict or intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate).

\textsuperscript{35} See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 710 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“What determines the scope of the right to bear arms are the ‘historical justifications’ that gave birth to it. . . .”; “[T]he state defendants have nothing to do with” as-applied challenge at issue); Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 363 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., concurring) (in as-applied Second Amendment challenge, “any resort to means-end scrutiny is inappropriate once it has been determined that the challenger’s circumstances distinguish him from the historical justifications supporting the regulation”); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.”); Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting) (“Judge Kavanaugh is correct”; “Heller and McDonald dictate that the scope of the Second Amendment be defined solely by reference to its text, history, and tradition.”), withdrawn and superseded on rehe’g, 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2012).

\textsuperscript{36} Bonidy v. United States Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015).
challenges and “appropriately places the burden on the government to justify its restrictions, while also giving governments considerable flexibility to regulate gun safety.” With the very limited exceptions discussed above, courts have widely embraced this logic in deeming intermediate scrutiny appropriate in the vast majority of Second Amendment cases.

B. After Heller, Courts Have Overwhelmingly Upheld Reasonable Gun Regulations

Regardless of any methodological divisions among the lower courts, in the vast majority of post-Heller cases, courts have rejected Second Amendment challenges and upheld the laws or criminal convictions at issue. As noted, in the more than 1,150 cases tracked by the Law Center, courts have rejected the Second Amendment claims 94% of the time. Below, we discuss specific types of gun safety laws and policies that courts have upheld over the last nine years.

I. Guns in Public

Among the most-litigated questions after Heller has been the extent to which the Second Amendment restricts government from regulating the carrying of guns in public. Heller did not reach this issue, and some courts have declined to extend Heller’s holding outside the home. Others have either assumed or explicitly ruled that the Second Amendment

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37 Id.
40 E.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e merely assume that the Heller right exists outside the home . . . . We are free to make that assumption” since the challenged law “passes constitutional muster under . . . intermediate scrutiny.”); Drake v. Flika, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e decline to definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home. . . . [W]e refrain from answering this question definitively because it is not necessary to our conclusion” that the challenged law is constitutional); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (“There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home,” but that issue is “a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity. . . . There is no such necessity here” because National Park Service restrictions on carrying guns in vehicles are constitutional.); see also Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 909 (D. Haw. 2012).
41 Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (while “the Supreme Court’s cases applying the Second Amendment have arisen only in connection with prohibitions on the possession of firearms in the home, the Court’s analysis suggests . . . the Amendment must have some application in the very different context of the public possession of firearms”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding “Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than the right to have a gun in one’s home”); Norman v. State, 215 So. 3d 18, 36 (Fla. 2017) (law prohibiting open carry of firearms implicates the Second Amendment since it “prohibits, in most instances, one manner of carrying arms in public.”); Murphy v. Guerrero, No. 1:14-CV-00026, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135684, at *76 (D. N. Mar. I. Sept. 28, 2016) (“This Court agrees that the Second Amendment . . . must protect a
applies at least to some degree outside the home.

There is a strong consensus among all of these courts, however, that the public carry of firearms may be subject to reasonable regulations. Even the courts that have held or assumed that the Second Amendment protects some right to carry a gun in public have expressly recognized the government’s broad authority to regulate guns in this context. As courts have observed, the government has much more authority to regulate guns in public, where firearms may endanger third parties, than in private homes.

Reflecting this consensus, courts have affirmed the constitutionality of laws restricting the carry of guns in public places. For example, while the Second Circuit assumed that the Second Amendment has some application in public, it upheld New York’s law limiting the carrying of handguns in public to those with “a special need for self-protection.” And the Florida Supreme Court, which also ruled that the Second Amendment applies to some extent in public, similarly upheld Florida’s ban on the open carry of firearms, emphasizing that both the Second Amendment right and Florida’s constitutional right to bear arms are “subject to legislative regulation.”

Overall, except when confronting laws that prohibit all people from publicly carrying guns in all circumstances, courts have overwhelmingly rejected challenges to laws regulating the carry of guns. They have decisively upheld laws requiring a license to carry a gun outside the home, as well as numerous conditions on such licenses, including:

right to armed self-defense in public.

E.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding there is a Second Amendment right to carry firearms in public, but “Illinois has lots of options for protecting its people from being shot without having to eliminate all possibility of armed self-defense in public,” including adopting a discretionary licensing scheme); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that “the Amendment must have some application” outside the home, but “[t]he state’s ability to regulate firearms and, for that matter, conduct, is qualitatively different in public” where “firearm rights have always been more limited” and there is a “tradition of states regulating firearm possession and use”); see also supra note 40 (cases assuming the Second Amendment does apply outside the home and nonetheless upholding public carry restrictions under heightened scrutiny).

United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”); Bonidy v. United States. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015) (declining to rule definitively on scope of Second Amendment outside the home, but recognizing the government’s “considerable flexibility to regulate gun safety” in public).


Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Our review of the history and tradition of firearm regulation does not ‘clearly demonstrate[]’ that limiting handgun possession in public to those who show a special need for self-protection is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. . . . [W]e decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to . . . question the state’s traditional authority to extensively regulate handgun possession in public.”) (citation omitted).

Norman v. State, 215 So. 3d 18, 28 (Fla. 2017).

• Requiring an applicant for a license to carry a concealed weapon to show “good cause,” “proper cause,” “need,” or to qualify as a “suitable person;” 48

• Requiring applicants for concealed carry licenses to submit affidavits showing good character; 49

• Prohibiting the issuance of a concealed carry license based on a misdemeanor assault conviction; 50

• Requiring a concealed carry applicant to be a state resident, 51 or to be at least twenty-one years old; 52 and

• Allowing the revocation of a concealed carry permit if law enforcement determines that the permit holder poses a material likelihood of harm. 53

Most notably, out of the seven federal courts of appeal that have directly reviewed challenges to regulations on concealed or open carry, six upheld the laws at issue in their entirety, including the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 54 Most of these decisions involved laws requiring all applicants for a concealed carry permit to show “good cause,” or a particularized need to carry a gun for self-defense. For instance, in *Kachalsky*, the Second Circuit rejected a challenge to New York’s requirement that applicants for a concealed weapons permit show “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community or of persons engaged in the same profession.” 55 Though the court assumed that the Second Amendment had “some” application outside of the home, it found, nonetheless, that the “special need” requirement satisfied intermediate scrutiny. 56 The Third

Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177-78 (Md. 2011).


54 Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Wohllard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013). The exception is the Seventh Circuit, which struck down Illinois’ total prohibition on the public carry of firearms in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).

55 Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).

56 Id. at 89, 98-99.
and Fourth Circuits upheld similar requirements in New Jersey and Maryland law that limit the issuance of concealed carry permits to applicants who can show a particularized need to carry a firearm in public.\(^5^7\)

Other courts have gone even farther. In *Peterson v. Martinez*, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that “the Second Amendment does not confer a right to carry concealed weapons,” in light of substantial historical evidence showing that most states banned concealed carry in the nineteenth century.\(^5^8\) The court upheld the concealed carry regulation at issue as outside the scope of the Second Amendment, without applying any heightened scrutiny.\(^5^9\) In June 2016, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in *Peruta v. County of San Diego*.\(^6^0\) The Ninth Circuit avoided answering the question of whether or to what degree the Second Amendment protects a right to carry firearms *openly* in public. Instead, the court upheld California’s requirement that a person show “good cause” for a concealed carry permit, after finding as the Tenth Circuit did that the Second Amendment does not protect the right of members of the general public to carry *concealed* firearms in public.\(^6^1\)

It is only when courts have considered laws amounting to a blanket ban on *all* carrying of guns in public by *all* persons that they have reached different conclusions from the courts above. For example, Illinois and Washington D.C. were among the last jurisdictions to completely prohibit the public carry of firearms.\(^6^2\) In 2012, the Seventh Circuit struck down Illinois’ law that entirely banned the carrying of loaded and accessible guns in public, calling it “the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states.”\(^6^3\) But in striking down the law, the Seventh Circuit was careful to note that Illinois has many policy options available to it to regulate the carry of firearms in public, including discretionary permit systems.\(^6^4\) Similarly, in 2014 a Washington D.C. court struck down the District’s “complete ban on the carrying of handguns in public,” while recognizing that the District could “adopt[] a licensing mechanism consistent with constitutional standards.”\(^6^5\)

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57 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).

58 Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1211 (10th Cir. 2013).

59 *Id.* at 1212 ("[B]ecause we conclude that the concealed carrying of firearms falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee, Peterson’s Second Amendment claim was properly subject to summary judgment.").

60 *Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego*, 824 F.3d 919, 942 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) ("[T]he Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public.").

61 *Id.*


63 *Moore v. Madigan*, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012).

64 *Id.* at 940-42.

After these decisions were issued, both Illinois and Washington D.C. adopted new public carry licensing systems. Illinois’ system has already survived several legal challenges, and two cases challenging the District’s new system are pending before the D.C. Circuit. Should the D.C. Circuit uphold the District’s permitting system, it would join the Seventh Circuit as well as the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits in affirming states’ authority to regulate the concealed carry of firearms through strong permitting laws.

II. Possession of Firearms by Criminals

Another significant policy courts have almost uniformly upheld is prohibitions on gun possession by criminals. Courts have repeatedly upheld laws banning firearms possession by people convicted of felonies and certain misdemeanors, including domestic violence crimes. In particular, courts have rejected the vast majority of challenges to laws prohibiting:

- Possession of firearms by persons convicted of felonies, including felony crimes alleged to be non-violent,


67 The D.C. Circuit is hearing a consolidated appeal from two district court decisions that reached different conclusions about the constitutionality of the District’s good-cause requirement for concealed carry permit applicants: Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 143 (D.D.C. 2016) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and noting that self-defense in public is “core” of Second Amendment right); and Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 167 F. Supp. 3d 86, 99 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, noting “Defendants have identified what appears to be substantial evidence of connections between public carrying of guns—and associated regulations on public carrying—and impacts on crime and public safety”). The consolidated appeal has been argued before a D.C. Circuit panel but no decision has been issued.


69 Hamilton v. Palozzi, 848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017) (application of Maryland felon-possession ban to challenger with credit card fraud convictions does not violate Second Amendment); United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir.
• Possession of firearms by persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors;\textsuperscript{70}

• Possession of firearms during the scope of employment by anyone working for a convicted felon (such as a bodyguard);\textsuperscript{71}

• Providing a firearm to a fugitive felon;\textsuperscript{72}

• Possession of firearms by an individual who is under indictment for a felony;\textsuperscript{73}

• Possession of firearms by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, or a category of individuals reasonably believed to be controlled substance users;\textsuperscript{74} and

• Possession of firearms during the commission of a crime.\textsuperscript{75}

Courts have also rejected challenges to sentence enhancements for criminals who possessed firearms while engaging in illegal activity.\textsuperscript{76} The courts have explained these decisions by citing the statements in \textit{Heller} and \textit{McDonald} that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” and that


\textsuperscript{72} \textit{United States v. Stegmeier}, 701 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 2012).


such measures are “presumptively lawful.”

Despite the near-uniformity of decisions rejecting challenges to these gun laws, a few outlier lower courts have taken a different approach. A federal district court in Illinois, for example, struck down a provision of Chicago law that prohibited the possession of firearms by anyone who had been convicted in any jurisdiction of the crime of unlawful use of a weapon. A federal district court in New York found a federal law imposing a pretrial bail condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm to be unconstitutional. And an Ohio trial court dismissed, on Second Amendment grounds, a criminal indictment against a defendant for possession of a firearm following a conviction for a drug crime, but only found the law at issue unconstitutional as applied to “a Defendant with no felony convictions . . . [who] possesses firearms in his home or business, for the limited purpose of self-defense.”

Recently, the en banc Third Circuit sustained two as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the federal law prohibiting gun possession by felons, though the court issued a badly fractured decision with no unified rationale. Since that decision, some district courts have allowed similar as-applied Second Amendment challenges to lifetime firearm possession prohibitions to proceed past a motion to dismiss. These decisions represent a small minority of courts, and they apply only to particular people who are able to show that their personal circumstances potentially warrant lifting a lifetime firearms prohibition. As discussed above, the vast majority of courts have upheld laws limiting or banning gun possession by persons convicted of crimes.

77 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27; see also, e.g., United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 317-20 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases relying on this language to uphold federal felon-in-possession ban and noting the Fourth Circuit’s own reliance on it when upholding bans on firearm possession by persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors).
78 Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117, 1125 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“the Chicago Firearm Ordinance basically provides that anyone convicted of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense relating to a firearm is forever barred from exercising his constitutional right to possess a firearm in his own home for self-defense . . . [d]ue to the significant lack of evidence indicating that a non-violent misdemeanant, like Gowder, poses a risk to society analogous to that of a felon or a violent misdemeanant . . . the Chicago Firearm Ordinance violates Gowder’s constitutional rights under the Second Amendment.”).
79 United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“the Adam Walsh Amendments violate due process by requiring that, as a condition of release on bail, an accused person be required to surrender his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm without giving that person an opportunity to contest whether such a condition is reasonably necessary in his case to secure the safety of the community. Because the Amendments do not permit an individualized determination, they are unconstitutional”); but see United States v. Kennedy, 327 Fed. Appx. 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (imposing the same condition but not directly addressing the Second Amendment issue).
III. Possession of Firearms by Other Dangerous People

Besides finding that laws prohibiting firearm possession by convicted criminals do not offend the Second Amendment, courts have also routinely upheld prohibitions that apply to other categories of persons determined to pose a threat to public safety. In particular, courts have upheld laws:

- Prohibiting the possession of firearms by individuals who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution;\(^{83}\)
- Prohibiting gun possession by people subject to a domestic violence restraining order;\(^ {84}\)
- Authorizing the seizure of firearms in cases of domestic violence;\(^ {85}\)
- Prohibiting the possession of handguns by juveniles,\(^ {86}\) and prohibiting federally licensed gun dealers from selling handguns to 18-20 year olds;\(^ {87}\)
- Prohibiting firearm possession by individuals who pose an imminent risk of danger to self or others;\(^ {88}\) and
- Prohibiting firearm possession by aliens present in the country illegally.\(^ {89}\)

\(^{83}\) In re Keyes, 2013 PA Super 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (rejecting challenge to a federal law prohibiting persons who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution from possessing firearms and finding that such laws were outside the scope of the Second Amendment and even if they were not, that the laws would also satisfy intermediate scrutiny); Heendeniya v. St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160968, at *38 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2015) (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) does not violate the Second Amendment “[i]n light of . . . the Supreme Court's assurances in Heller and McDonald that the Court did not intend to cast doubt on longstanding regulatory measures prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”); cf. Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (as-applied Second Amendment violation found where plaintiff was committed for eight days at age 15, and had since served in the military and worked as a correctional officer.).

\(^{84}\) United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to prohibition on the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders); United States v. Elkins, 495 F. App’x 330 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Harris, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19654 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 2, 2016) (holding that Second Amendment not violated by statute prohibiting firearm possession for those subject to a domestic violence restraining order); United States v. Luedtke, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117970 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (holding that Second Amendment not violated by statute prohibiting firearm possession for those subject to a domestic violence restraining order).


\(^{86}\) United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009).

\(^{87}\) Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, (5th Cir. 2013).

\(^{88}\) Hope v. State, 163 Conn. App. 36, 43 (2016) (the challenged statute “does not implicate the Second Amendment, as it does not restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of their homes. It restricts for up to one year the rights of only those whom a court has adjudged to pose a risk of imminent physical harm to themselves or others after affording due process protection to challenge the seizure of the firearms.”).

Courts have reached a different outcome in only limited circumstances. For example, when reviewing the federal law that prohibits gun possession by people who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, two courts departed from the categorical reasoning employed in the above decisions, suggesting that in some cases, the lifetime nature of that prohibition might violate the Second Amendment. Both cases involved as-applied challenges brought by plaintiffs who had been involuntarily committed many years ago; both plaintiffs alleged that they had since recovered from mental illness, but had no available means to restore their gun rights other than by bringing a Second Amendment challenge.  

In *Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department*, the en banc Sixth Circuit ruled that a 74-year-old plaintiff who was involuntarily committed thirty years ago after a difficult divorce could bring an as-applied challenge to the federal law prohibiting him from possessing firearms on the basis of his commitment. A fractured majority of the court agreed that intermediate scrutiny governed the plaintiff’s challenge, and the court remanded the case to the district court, explaining that in order to justify the lifetime ban under this standard, the government should present specific evidence either that the plaintiff is still mentally ill, or that a lifetime possession prohibition is necessary for all who have been involuntarily committed, regardless of how long ago it occurred. 

A district court in the Third Circuit went even further in another as-applied challenge, holding that a plaintiff had, in fact, shown it was unconstitutional to prohibit him from possessing guns on the basis of a ten year-old mental commitment. One of the plaintiffs in *Keyes v. Lynch* was involuntarily committed when he was fifteen years old after becoming suicidal when his parents divorced; after his commitment, plaintiff recovered, served in the army, and became a corrections officer. In both roles, he was permitted to possess and use firearms in his professional capacity, but not in his home, because of his prior commitment. The court concluded the plaintiff had “compellingly demonstrated” that he no longer poses a mental health-related threat, particularly because it is “illogical” that the plaintiff may now “possess firearms in his professional capacities but not . . . for protection in his own home.”


90 *Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t*, 837 F.3d 678, 682-83 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 2016) (en banc) (noting that states may establish “a relief-from-disabilities program that allows individuals barred by § 922(g)(4) to apply to have their rights restored,” but that plaintiff’s home state of Michigan has not established such a program); *Keyes v. Lynch*, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (plaintiff’s state, Pennsylvania, also does not have a qualifying relief program).  

91 Id. at 699. The case was remanded to the Western District of Michigan, where plaintiff’s challenge is still pending.  

92 *Id.* at 706-08.  


94 *Id.* at 722.
an involuntary mental commitment. Even then, the decisions do not cast doubt on the overall constitutionality of laws prohibiting gun possession by individuals whose mental illnesses or mental health history currently makes them a risk to themselves or others: both the Tyler and Keyes decisions apply only to the specific plaintiffs in those cases, who alleged that their commitment took place many years ago, and who were required by the reviewing courts to show that they had recovered from mental illness. And, of course, the decisions do not cast doubt on the constitutionality of laws disarming other dangerous people, like domestic abusers or people subject to restraining orders.

IV. Particularly Dangerous Weapons and Ammunition

As mentioned above, in Heller, the Supreme Court noted that one limitation on the Second Amendment right is “the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” The Court acknowledged that “weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned” without violating the Second Amendment. The Court also recognized that its prior decision in Miller explained that the weapons protected by the Second Amendment are those “in common use at the time”; Miller held that for this reason, short-barreled shotguns are unprotected.

Seizing upon Heller’s citation to Miller, gun lobby lawyers have urged courts to rely solely on a broad version of what has become known as the “common use” test when deciding whether a dangerous weapon or accessory may be regulated consistently with the Second Amendment. Under the gun lobby’s proposed standard, once any gun or accessory achieves a sufficient market share that it can be considered “common,” it becomes constitutionally immune from regulation. In a dissent from the denial of certiorari in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Thomas appeared to endorse this version of the common use test, and suggested that under the test, civilians have a Second Amendment right to possess assault weapons simply because they are somewhat popular among gun owners.

But Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote in dissent, suggesting that other justices would not necessarily find the common use test dispositive in challenges to assault weapon regulations. And many lower courts that have considered challenges to restrictions on civilian possession of military-style firearms and accessories—including assault weapons and large-capacity magazines—have rejected the argument that if a firearm is in “common use” (however

96 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
97 Id.
98 Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
99 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“The City’s ban is thus highly suspect because it broadly prohibits common semiautomatic firearms used for lawful purposes. Roughly five million Americans own AR-style semiautomatic rifles. (citation omitted) The overwhelming majority of citizens who own and use such rifles do so for lawful purposes, including self-defense and target shooting. (citation omitted) Under our precedents, that is all that is needed for citizens to have a right under the Second Amendment to keep such weapons.”); but see Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The record shows that perhaps 9% of the nation’s firearms owners have assault weapons, but what line separates ‘common’ from ‘uncommon’ ownership is something the [Supreme] Court did not say.”).
measured) it is constitutionally immune from regulation. Some have observed that the test is problematic because it is unclear how popular a weapon must be to be “common,” and further, that the test is illogical, because it would only definitively allow governments to restrict access to those weapons that are uncommon because they are already prohibited.

Other courts have held that, even if a weapon is in “common use,” that does not end the inquiry. Instead, they have determined that even if a gun is commonly owned and presumptively within the scope of the Second Amendment, courts must still apply heightened scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of the law at issue. Using assault weapons and large-capacity magazines as an example, in the vast majority of cases, courts have upheld laws restricting these weapons and accessories after assuming common use, but then applying intermediate scrutiny or a similar test. In other cases, instead of applying intermediate scrutiny, courts have resolved challenges at step one of the two-step analysis, by relying on Heller’s recognition that “M-16 rifles and the like” may permissibly be banned. These courts have upheld prohibitions on the civilian possession of assault weapons by reasoning that these are “like” the machine guns that Heller expressly permits prohibiting, because “the AR-15 [] is simply the semiautomatic version of the M16 rifle used by our military and others around the world.”

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102 E.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[T]he Heller decision raises various questions. Those include: How many assault weapons and large-capacity magazines must there be to consider them ‘in common use at the time?‘ In resolving that issue, should we focus on how many assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are owned; or on how many owners there are; or on how many of the weapons and magazines are merely in circulation? Do we count the weapons and magazines in Maryland only, or in all of the United States?”); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hat line separates ‘common’ from ‘uncommon’ ownership is something the [Supreme] Court did not say.”).

103 E.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015) (“relying on how common a weapon is at the time of litigation would be circular to boot. Machine guns aren’t commonly owned for lawful purposes today because they are illegal; semi-automatic weapons with large-capacity magazines are owned more commonly because, until recently (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet it would be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon can be banned is that there is a statute banning that it, so that it isn’t commonly owned. A law’s existence can’t be the source of its own constitutional validity.”).

104 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 261-64 (2d Cir. 2015) (New York and Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semi-automatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines survive intermediate scrutiny and do not violate the Second Amendment); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (upholding local ordinance prohibiting assault weapons and large capacity magazines, after examining evidence including that “linking the availability of assault weapons to gun-related homicides”); Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”), 670 F.3d 1244, 1260-64 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding the District’s ban on assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines after applying intermediate scrutiny); see also Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015); Colo. Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (D. Colo. 2014).

105 Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“Because the banned assault weapons and large capacity magazines are ‘like’ ‘M-16 rifles’—‘weapons that are most useful in military service’—they are among those arms that the Second Amendment does not shield.”); People v. Zondorak, 220 Cal. App. 4th 829, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“assault weapons are only slightly removed from M-16-type weapons that Heller” concluded were outside the Second Amendment); People v. James, 174 Cal. App. 4th 662, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (assault weapons fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment because they are “at least as dangerous and unusual as the short-barreled shotgun”); see also Kampfer v. Cuomo, 993 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195-196, 195 n.10 (N.D.N.Y 2014) (upholding New York’s assault weapons ban by finding it does not substantially burden Second Amendment rights).

In addition to upholding restrictions on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, courts have upheld laws banning other particularly dangerous weapons, as well. These include laws:

- Prohibiting the possession, sale, and manufacture of machine guns;¹⁰⁵
- Prohibiting the sale of “particularly dangerous ammunition” that has no sporting purpose;¹⁰⁶
- Prohibiting the possession of silencers, short-barreled shotguns, grenades, smoke grenades, pipe bombs, and mines;¹⁰⁷
- Requiring registration and taxation of short-barreled shotguns and silencers;¹⁰⁸
- Forbidding the possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number;¹⁰⁹
- Prohibiting the carrying of a concealed dirk or dagger outside of the home;¹¹⁰ and
- Prohibiting the possession of switchblades or gravity knives.¹¹¹

V. Commercial Sale of Firearms

The Supreme Court stated in *Heller* that “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” are presumptively lawful regulatory measures that do not offend the Second Amendment.¹¹² Relying on this statement, lower courts have routinely upheld laws regulating the sale of firearms and accessories, including laws:

- Prohibiting the sale of guns and ammunition to people younger than twenty-one,¹¹³

¹⁰⁵ *Hollis v. Lynch*, 827 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2016); *Watson aka United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame*, 822 F.3d 136 (3rd Cir. 2016); *United States v. Henry*, 688 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2012); *United States v. Fincher*, 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2008).

¹⁰⁶ *Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco*, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014).

¹⁰⁷ *See United States v. McCartney*, 357 Fed. Appx. 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Silencers, grenades, and directional mines are not ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes’ (citation omitted) and are less common than either short-barreled shotguns or machine guns. The weapons involved in this case therefore are not protected by the Second Amendment.”); *United States v. Cox*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13605 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2017) (short-barreled shotguns and silencers are not within the scope of the Second Amendment); *Stauder v. Stephens*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31222 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2016) (upholding state law prohibiting possession of smoke grenade); *United States v. Garcia*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113748 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (upholding federal prohibition on the possession of pipe bombs and noting that “Defendant has made no showing that the Constitution ... was referring to pipe bombs.”).


¹⁰⁹ *United States v. Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).


¹¹² *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-27.

¹¹³ *Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives*, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012), *rehearing*
• Requiring a waiting period before firearms may be transferred to a purchaser, to discourage impulsive criminal acts and suicides.\footnote{Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 828 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that waiting periods serve an important function even for people who already own firearms, because “[a]n individual who already owns a hunting rifle, for example, may want to purchase a larger capacity weapon that will do more damage when fired into a crowd. A 10-day cooling-off period would serve to discourage such conduct and would impose no serious burden on the core Second Amendment right of defense of the home identified in Heller.”).}

• Requiring that all new handguns sold meet certain safety requirements, including firing and drop testing, the inclusion of chamber loaded indicators, and the incorporation of microstamping technology.\footnote{Draper v. Healey, 98 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D. Mass. 2015) (upholding Massachusetts’ requirement that handguns sold in the state contain a load indicator or magazine safety disconnect), aff’d on other grounds by Draper v. Healey, 827 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016); Peña v. Lindley, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23575 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (upholding all aspects of California’s Unsafe Handgun Act), appeal docketed, No. 15-15449 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2015). Peña is currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.}

• Imposing a fee on all firearm sales conducted with a state;\footnote{Bauer v. Harris, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d on other grounds by Bauer v. Becerra, 858 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding California’s $19 Dealer Record of Sale (“DROS”) fee, and stating that the “fee is a condition on the sale of firearms . . . [t]he DROS fee, therefore, is a presumptively lawful regulatory measure. Accordingly, the DROS fee is constitutional because it ‘falls outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment’.”).}

• Requiring a license to engage in firearms dealing.\footnote{United States v. Hosford, 843 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (federal law prohibiting unlicensed firearms dealing is a facially constitutional “longstanding condition or qualification on the commercial sale of arms”).}

VI. Firearms in Sensitive Places

Courts have relied on similar reasoning to uphold laws prohibiting the carry of firearms in sensitive public areas. As with conditions on the commercial sale of firearms, “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” are among the presumptively lawful regulatory measures \emph{Heller} recognized.\footnote{Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.} Since the \emph{Heller} list is non-exhaustive,\footnote{Id. at 627 n.6 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”).} courts have upheld laws prohibiting guns in a variety of sensitive public areas (in addition to schools and government buildings). Courts have also upheld such laws by applying intermediate scrutiny. Overall, under either approach, the vast majority of courts have upheld laws:


- Prohibiting the possession of firearms in college facilities and at campus events;\footnote{Digiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 281 Va. 127, 136, 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (2011) (noting that}
• Prohibiting the carrying of a loaded and accessible firearm in a motor vehicle;\(^\text{122}\)
• Forbidding possession of a firearm in national parks or other federal property;\(^\text{123}\)
• Prohibiting the possession of firearms in places of worship;\(^\text{124}\)
• Prohibiting the possession of firearms in common areas of public housing units;\(^\text{125}\)
• Prohibiting the possession of guns on county-owned property;\(^\text{126}\) and
• Prohibiting the possession of guns in a federal court facility.\(^\text{127}\)

VII. Other Regulations

Courts across the country have also upheld numerous other laws regulating firearms, including those related to the following:

• Firearm Ownership
  • Generally requiring the registration of all firearms.\(^\text{128}\)

weapons were prohibited “only in those places where people congregate and are most vulnerable ... Individuals may still carry or possess weapons on the open grounds of GMU, and in other places on campus not enumerated in the regulation.”); *Tribble v. State Bd. of Educ.*, No. 11-0069 (Dist. Ct. Idaho Dec. 7, 2011) (upholding University of Idaho policy prohibiting firearms in University-owned housing); *Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of Fla.*, 180 So. 3d 137, 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding policy prohibiting guns in university housing, citing the ‘presumptively lawful’ language in *Heller* that included “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools.”); *Clark v. City of Shawnee*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1758 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 2017); *Ohio v. Rush*, 2012-Ohio-5919 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).


\(^\text{126}\) *Nordyke v. King*, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).


\(^\text{128}\) *Justice v. Town of Cicero*, 577 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that registration “merely regulated gun possession” rather than prohibiting it), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 965 (2010); *Heller v. District of Columbia* (“*Heller III*”), 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (firearm registration generally does not violate the Second Amendment, but certain aspects of registration do not survive review, such as knowledge of the law testing, re-registration requirements, limiting registration to one handgun per month, and requirement to bring the firearm in person to register).
o Requiring background checks for private firearm transfers;\textsuperscript{129}
o Requiring an individual to possess a license to own a handgun;\textsuperscript{130}
o Requiring handgun permit applicants to pay $340 every three years;\textsuperscript{131} and

- **Firearm Safety**

  o Requiring the safe storage of handguns in the home;\textsuperscript{132}
  o Prohibiting the possession of a firearm while intoxicated;\textsuperscript{133} and
  o Requiring the safe storage of firearms in vehicles.\textsuperscript{134}

\textbf{VIII. Successful Second Amendment Claims}

Despite judicial decisions upholding the overwhelming majority of gun laws, in a few outlier cases, courts have sustained Second Amendment claims. As discussed above, courts in Illinois and Washington, D.C. struck down laws completely banning the carry of concealed weapons in public.\textsuperscript{135} The Seventh Circuit also enjoined enforcement of a Chicago ordinance banning firing ranges within city limits where range training was a condition of lawful handgun ownership,\textsuperscript{136} and the same panel later struck down Chicago’s zoning law restricting the places where firing ranges could operate, as well as an age restriction prohibiting entry into firing ranges by supervised minors.\textsuperscript{137} As also noted, courts have approved a handful of as-applied challenges to federal prohibitions on firearm possession for various categories of persons, including in the Third and Sixth Circuits.\textsuperscript{138} And the D.C. Circuit, while upholding the central components of Washington’s gun registration system, struck down other provisions in

\textsuperscript{131} Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding $340 fee); see also Bauer v. Becerra, 858 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding California’s $19 Dealer Record of Sale (“DROS”) fee).
\textsuperscript{136} See Ezell v. City of Chicago (“Ezell I”), 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
\textsuperscript{137} Ezell v. City of Chicago (“Ezell II”), 846 F.3d 888, 894 (7th Cir. 2017).
\textsuperscript{138} Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dept’, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (directing that intermediate scrutiny be applied on remand to as-applied challenge to federal firearm prohibition for persons involuntarily committed to a mental institution); Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (applying intermediate scrutiny and invalidating federal firearms prohibition as applied to two plaintiffs with decades-old misdemeanor convictions the court concluded were not “serious”); see also Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
the law, including a restriction on registering multiple guns each month and a requirement that residents pass a test on the District’s gun laws.\textsuperscript{139}

Federal trial courts have ruled in favor of Second Amendment claims in various cases, several of which are currently being appealed. A district court in the Seventh Circuit struck down a Chicago law completely banning the sale or transfer of firearms except through inheritance, but explicitly reiterated that cities and states have broad authority to regulate the sale of firearms, including limits on the locations where dealers may operate.\textsuperscript{140} A district court in the Ninth Circuit, citing the now-vacated Peruta panel opinion, struck down regulations prohibiting the possession of firearms on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers property.\textsuperscript{141} And another district court, applying strict scrutiny, struck down a federal law requiring out-of-state purchases of handguns to be completed by an in-state federally licensed dealer.\textsuperscript{142}

In 2016, in \textit{Radich v. Guerrero}, a federal district court struck down a regulatory system in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI), a US territory, which prohibited most private individuals from possessing and importing handguns and handgun ammunition. The court found this general prohibition on handgun possession to violate the Second Amendment, noting that “the Commonwealth’s ban on handguns cannot be squared with the Second Amendment right described in \textit{Heller} and \textit{McDonald}.”\textsuperscript{143} Later that year, the same federal district court struck down other aspects of CNMI’s gun laws, including a $1,000 handgun excise tax, a blanket prohibition on the public carry of firearms, a ban on certain assault weapons features, and a ban on long guns with caliber greater than .223.\textsuperscript{144}

Other outliers include a North Carolina federal district court decision finding that a state law prohibiting the carrying of firearms during states of emergency violated the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights,\textsuperscript{145} a Massachusetts federal district court decision finding that a U.S. citizenship requirement for possessing and carrying firearms violated the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights,\textsuperscript{146} and a Michigan appellate court decision striking down a state law prohibiting the possession of Tasers and stun guns, concluding that the Second Amendment protects the possession and open carrying of those devices.\textsuperscript{147}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[139] Heller v. District of Columbia ("\textit{Heller III}"), 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
\item[140] See Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 939-47 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("To address the City’s concern that gun stores make ripe targets for burglary, the City can pass more targeted ordinances aimed at making gun stores more secure—for example, by requiring that stores install security . . . Or the City can consider designating special zones for gun stores to limit the area that police would have to patrol. ... [N]othing in this opinion prevents the City from considering other regulations—short of the complete ban—on sales and transfers of firearms to minimize the access of criminals to firearms and to track the ownership of firearms.").
\item[142] See Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (applying strict scrutiny in striking down federal statutes requiring out-of-state handgun purchases to be processed by an in-state FFL).
\item[147] Michigan v. Yanna, 297 Mich. App. 137 (2012). Notably, prior to this decision, the former law at issue was replaced
\end{footnotes}
THE SUPREME COURT HAS REPEATEDLY DENIED CERTIORARI IN SECOND AMENDMENT CASES

Since issuing its opinions in *Heller* and *McDonald*, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to hear any new cases raising Second Amendment issues. The sole exception is *Caetano v. Massachusetts* (2016), involving a Massachusetts law prohibiting private possession of stun guns. In a *per curiam* opinion, the Court did not rule that stun guns are protected by the Second Amendment, but vacated and remanded the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the state’s stun gun ban. The state later dropped the prosecution at issue, so the *Caetano* case did not continue after remand.

To date, other than in *Caetano*, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in more than 70 Second Amendment cases since *Heller*, including:

- Cases challenging laws restricting the concealed and/or open carrying of firearms in public;\(^{150}\)
- Cases challenging the constitutionality of laws prohibiting felons, domestic abusers, and/or certain misdemeanants from possessing firearms;\(^{151}\)
- Cases challenging laws enhancing sentences for possessing a firearm while committing a crime;\(^{152}\)
- Cases challenging laws restricting the possession of machine guns, assault weapons, large capacity magazines, and other military-style weapons;\(^{153}\)

by a new law that allows the carrying of a Taser or stun gun with a valid concealed weapon license.


\(^{149}\) *Id.* at 1027-28 (concluding that “the explanation the Massachusetts court offered for upholding the law contradicts this Court’s precedent. Consequently ... The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”); *but see id.* at 1032-33 (concurrence of Alito, J., and Thomas, J.) (“[T]he pertinent Second Amendment inquiry is whether stun guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes today....While less popular than handguns, stun guns are widely owned and accepted as a legitimate means of self-defense across the country. Massachusetts’ categorical ban of such weapons therefore violates the Second Amendment.”).


\(^{152}\) *Kearns v. United States*, 181 L. Ed. 2d 226 (2011).

• Cases challenging firearm registration requirements and related fees;\textsuperscript{154} and

• Cases challenging firearm restrictions in national parks and other publicly owned places.\textsuperscript{155}

As a result, the numerous federal and state court decisions upholding the laws described above have been left undisturbed.\textsuperscript{156}

**CONCLUSION**

Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Heller* and *McDonald*, the nation’s lower courts have been inundated with a substantial volume of Second Amendment litigation. As described above, in the vast majority of these cases, courts have rejected Second Amendment attacks on reasonable gun laws and recognized that most federal, state and local firearms laws are plainly constitutional. Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that the volume of Second Amendment litigation will decrease substantially. Past experience suggests that the gun lobby will continue to bring costly—if ultimately unsuccessful—lawsuits and to employ the threat of litigation to obstruct state and local efforts to enact commonsense gun violence prevention measures. Policymakers should rest assured, however, that the developing body of Second Amendment law unambiguously affirms their ability to adopt a wide variety of reasonable laws to reduce gun violence.

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\textsuperscript{156} For more information on Court’s pattern of denying certiorari in Second Amendment cases, see the Law Center’s report, at smartgunlaws.org/protecting-strong-gun-laws-the-supreme-court-leaves-lower-court-victories-untouched.